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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is proper pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW; AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
Issue No 1; whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 
restricted Mr. Gallup's right to testify on his own behalf concerning where he was 
on the day he allegedly committed the crimes of failing to respond to an officer's 
signal, driving on a revoked or suspended license, and speeding, because such 
testimony constituted an alibi defense which should have been disclosed ten days 
prior to the trial, notwithstanding the plain language of the alibi statute which 
states that a defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. 
Standard of Review: in order to challenge the trial court's conclusions of 
law the appellant must show legal error by the court in its use of fixed principles 
and rules of law, demonstrating that the court incorrectly selected, interpreted or 
applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("Appellate review 
of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
'correctness'"). Correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for itself 
without deference in any degree to the trial court's determination of law. Id. at 
935. The trial court's conclusions of law in a criminal case are reviewed for 
1 
correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, If 11, 162 P. 3d 1106. Further, the 
trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ^ } 10, 127 P. 2d 246. 
Preservation of the Issue: the issue was preserved in the trial court. (R: 186; 
52-53, 55-56, 59, 61-63, 101-102) 
Issue No, 2: if the trial court's interpretation of the alibi statute is correct, 
whether the statute's application in this case violated Mr. Gallup"s constitutional 
rights when it required him to give the State advance notice of his testimony and 
when it precluded him from testifying concerning alibi because he failed to give 
such notice. 
Standard of Review: in order to challenge the trial court's conclusions of 
law the appellant must show legal error by the court in its use of fixed principles 
and rules of law, demonstrating that the court incorrectly selected, interpreted or 
applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("Appellate review 
of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
'correctness'"). Correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for itself 
without deference in any degree to the trial court's determination of law. Id. at 
935. The trial court's conclusions of law in a criminal case are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, | 11, 162 P. 3d 1106. Whether the 
trial court properly denied a defendant in a criminal case the right to confront the 
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witnesses against him is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, \ 47, 125 P. 3d 878. Further, although underlying factual 
matters are within the discretion of the trial court, whether a given set of facts 
gives rise to a constitutional violation is a matter of law which the appellate court 
reviews de novo. State v. Maas, 991 P. 2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1999) 
Preservation of the Issue: the issue was preserved in the trial court (R: 186; 
52-53, 55-56, 59, 61-63, 101-102) and in any event would otherwise constitute 
plain error. United States v. Bur son, 952 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a violation of the Fifth Amendment constitutes plain error). 
Issue No, 3: whether the prosecutor's questions and comments during his 
case-in-chief, cross examination of Mr. Gallup, and closing argument, concerning 
Mr. Gallup's exercise of his right to remain silent during the police investigation, 
violated Mr. Gallup's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
Standard of Review: in order to challenge the trial court's conclusions of 
law the appellant must show legal error by the court in its use of fixed principles 
and rules of law, demonstrating that the court incorrectly selected, interpreted or 
applied the law. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("Appellate review 
of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
'correctness'"). Correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for itself 
without deference in any degree to the trial court's determination of law. Id. at 
3 
935. The trial court's conclusions of law in a criminal case are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, f 11, 162 P. 3d 1106. Further, 
although underlying factual matters are within the discretion of the trial court, 
whether a given set of facts gives rise to a constitutional violation is a matter of 
law which the appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Maas, 991 P. 2d 1108, 
1111 (Utah App. 1999) 
Preservation of the Issue: the issue was preserved in the trial court (R: 186; 
14-15, 89, 101-102) and in any event would otherwise constitute plain error. 
United States v. Burson, 952 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
violation of Fifth Amendment constitutes plain error). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. V. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or properly, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2. Alibi - Notice Requirements - Witness Lists 
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been made, who intends to 
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less than 10 days before trial or at such other 
time as the court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in 
writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice shall contain specific information 
as to the place where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged 
offense and, as particularly as is known to the defendant or his attorney, the names 
and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish alibi. The 
prosecuting attorney, not more than five days after receipt of the list provided 
herein or at such other time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the 
defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are known to him, of the witnesses 
the state proposes to offer to contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing duty to 
disclose the names and addresses of additional witnesses which come to the 
attention of either party after filing their alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply with the requirements of 
this section, the court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi. 
However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a criminal prosecution for a road traffic incident on 
Interstate 15 which allegedly occurred on October 22, 2008. (R: 6) 
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On April 1, 2009, about five months after the alleged incident, the State filed 
an information charging Jeffrey Gallup (hereinafter "Mr. Gallup") with failing to 
respond to an officer's signal (a third degree felony), driving on a suspended or 
revoked license (a class B misdemeanor), and speeding (a class C misdemeanor). 
(R: 1-2) 
An initial appearance was held on May 13, 2009 (R: 14), and a preliminary 
hearing was held on September 9, 2009. (R: 47) 
At the preliminary hearing the court made a finding of probable cause and 
bound the case over for trial. (R: 47) 
An arraignment was held on September 23, 2009, where Mr. Gallup pled 
"not guilty" to the charges against him. (R: 51) 
A final pretrial conference was held on November 18, 2009. (R: 78) 
A jury trial was held on January 5, 2010. (R: 125) The trial court granted 
the State's motion to prevent Mr. Gallup from testifying concerning alibi and 
denied Mr. Gallup's motion to exclude evidence concerning his pre-arrest silence. 
(R: 186; 14-15, 59, 61, 63) The jury returned guilty verdicts against Mr. Gallup on 
all counts. (R: 125) 
A sentencing hearing was held on February 17, 2010, and the court 
sentenced Mr. Gallup to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah 
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State Prison. (R: 167) Mr. Gallup is presently incarcerated in connection with this 
case on appeal. 
A notice of appeal was filed on March 17, 2010, along with a request for a 
transcript of the trial proceedings. (R: 182) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 22, 2008 at approximately 11:22 pm, Trooper Jared 
Clanton (hereinafter uthe trooper") was stationary in his squad car facing 
northbound on 1-15 in Utah County at mile marker 285 (in Lehi near the point-of-
the-mountain) when he observed a speeding vehicle heading southbound in the far 
right lane. (R: 186; 22) According to the trooper, the vehicle was traveling at 88 
miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone. (R: 186; 23-25) 
The trooper turned around and followed the vehicle. He activated his 
overhead lights and the vehicle came to a halt at mile marker 282. (R: 186; 24) 
The trooper communicated the vehicle's license plate number to dispatch and then 
exited his squad car. (R: 186; 26) 
On exiting his squad car the trooper noticed that the suspect vehicle was a 
blue four-door BMW, that its rear and side door windows were tinted and difficult 
to see through, and that the rearview mirror was rotated up and down instead of 
side-to-side. (R: 186; 26, 40-41). According to the trooper, the squad car's 
overhead lights and spotlight were shining on the back of the vehicle. This created 
7 
a silhouette effect because the spotlight shone through the vehicle's rear window. 
(R: 186; 25-26, 41) 
The trooper grabbed his flash light, which was turned off at the time, and 
approached the vehicle on the passenger side. (R: 186; 27) According to the 
trooper, he was coming up on the rear passenger side door when he briefly 
observed the driver to be a white male with brown hair in his thirties. (R: 186; 28, 
49) The trooper admitted this could easily describe a large number of people in the 
population. (R: 186; 41-42) However, before he could make a better identification 
or talk to the unknown driver, the vehicle suddenly accelerated and sped away. (R: 
186; 29) The trooper did not even have time to turn on his flashlight. (R: 186; 41) 
Startled, the trooper ran back to his squad car and chased the vehicle, but he was 
never able to keep up with it and he eventually lost sight of it. (R: 186; 29-31) 
Via dispatch the trooper was able to ascertain the registered owner of the 
vehicle as one Jeffrey Gallup (hereinafter, "Mr. Gallup"). (R: 186; 33) The 
trooper obtained Mr. Gallup's telephone number and called him about one hour 
after the incident at approximately 12:22 am in the early hours of the next morning. 
(R: 186; 35, 77) According to the trooper a male voice answered the phone. The 
trooper asked, "Is Mr. Jeffery Gallup there?" and the male voice answered, "This is 
Jeffery." The trooper identified himself as "Trooper Clanton with Highway 
Patrol" and asked Mr. Gallup if he would tell the trooper his location because he 
g 
wanted to meet with him to "talk" to Mr. Gallup "about an incident." There was a 
brief moment of silence and Mr. Gallup then hung up the phone. (R: 186; 36) 
The trooper did not file formal charges against Mr. Gallup until March of 
2009, in spite of the incident allegedly occurring five months earlier. (R: 186; 44) 
He stated that this was because the case was "weighing on [him]" and that he 
"spoke with multiple people." (R: 186; 44) 
Before the trial Mr. Gallup moved the court to exclude evidence of the 
phone conversation arguing that it was irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. The 
court denied the motion. (R: 186; 3-4, 10-11) Mr. Gallup also moved the court to 
exclude any testimony by the trooper that Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the 
phone after the trooper identified himself as a law enforcement officer to Mr. 
Gallup and posed questions to Mr. Gallup about the incident. Mr. Gallup argued 
that such testimony infringed his constitutional right against self incrimination and 
to remain silent in the face of police questioning. The court denied this motion too, 
but stated that the objection was preserved for the purposes of appeal. (R: 186; 14-
15) 
During his case-in-chief the prosecutor elicited testimony from the trooper 
that Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the phone after the trooper identified 
himself to Mr. Gallup and posed questions to him. (R: 186; 35-36) 
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Following the prosecution's case Mr. Gallup informed the court that he 
wanted to take the stand and testify. (R: 186; 52) At that point the prosecution 
moved that any testimony by Mr. Gallup that he was somewhere else on the night 
in question be excluded because it constituted an alibi defense, and Mr. Gallup had 
not provided the prosecution with advance notice that his testimony would be that 
he was somewhere else. (R: 186; 53) 
Mr. Gallup argued that notwithstanding the notice requirements, the alibi 
statute always allows a defendant to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. (R: 
186; 55) He also argued that in addition to this statutory right, he had the 
fundamental and constitutional right to take the stand, explain his version of the 
facts, and respond to the accusations against him, by virtue of his status as an 
accused individual in a criminal prosecution initiated by the State. Further, he also 
argued that as the defendant he did not have the burden of proof, and that requiring 
him to give the State advance notice of his own testimony violated his 
constitutional right to remain silent. (R: 186; 61-62) 
After hearing argument the trial court held that any testimony placing Mr. 
Gallup somewhere else was an alibi defense and was therefore precluded because 
he had failed to provide advance written notice of the subject matter of his 
testimony to the State. (R: 186; 59, 61, 63) Further, that the third subsection of the 
alibi statute permitting a defendant to "always testify on his own behalf concerning 
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alibi" did not negate the previous subsections governing notice, and that Mr. 
Gallup should have given advance notice of his own testimony if it consisted of 
placing him somewhere else, regardless of whether he intended on offering 
evidence other than his own testimony to prove that alibi. (R: 186; 63) 
Mr. Gallup then took the stand and testified that his vehicle was grey (not 
blue like the trooper said) and that the rear window was tinted with approximately 
thirty-five percent light diffusion. (R: 186; 25, 75) He also testified that the 
trooper called him using a blocked number and identified himself to Mr. Gallup as 
a law enforcement officer before asking him questions. (R: 186; 77) There was 
some testimony from Mr. Gallup that he may have loaned his vehicle out on the 
night in question (R: 186; 76), that he did not recall being in Utah County that 
night, and that he was not pulled over by a trooper that night. (R: 186; 78) 
However, he did not testify concerning where he was that night because the court 
had already barred him from doing so. (R: 186; 59, 61, 63) 
The prosecutor then cross examined Mr. Gallup and questioned him about 
his silence in the face of questioning by the trooper, repeatedly asking Mr. Gallup 
questions like, "didn't it seem important to talk to the officer . . . about the 
incident?", "didn't it seem important to ask the officer more about what he was 
calling about?", "did you ask the officer, 'hey, why are you calling me?", "why 
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didn't you respond?", "why did you hang up?" and "did you then follow up with 
him . . . and ask more questions, or did you just hang up on him?" (R: 186; 79-80) 
During closing argument the prosecutor commented to the jury that, "if there 
was some sort of explanation he could offer [the trooper] to get him away from 
realizing that he was the real driver, that was the opportunity to tell [], and he 
didn't." The prosecutor made other comments such as, "when he had an 
opportunity within [] an hour of the incident, he failed to take that opportunity to 
talk to the officer about the incident, to explain it away somehow" and "as a result. 
. . I say you find him guilty." (R: 186; 82-83) 
During rebuttal the prosecutor told the jury, "he hung up the phone. Is that 
reasonable to believe tha t . . . he was just exercising his right to remain silent?" 
"Did he say, T decided to exercise my right to remain silent?" (R: 186; 89) At 
that point Mr. Gallup objected arguing that he was not required to use such words 
and that the prosecutor's comments were inappropriate. The court overruled the 
objection while at the same time stating, "Although I think enough's been said." 
The prosecutor then concluded his argument with these words: "Hanging up the 
phone, ladies and gentlemen, showed his consciousness of guilt" (R: 186; 89) 
The jury subsequently found Mr. Gallup guilty on all counts. (R: 186; 97) 
However, during deliberation the jury asked the court a question wanting to know 
where Mr. Gallup claimed to be on the night in question. The court responded that 
12 
such testimony by Mr. Gallup had been precluded by the court's earlier ruling. (R: 
186; 93-94) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error by restricting Mr. Gallup's 
statutory and constitutional right to testify on his own behalf when it ruled that Mr. 
Gallup could not testify that he was somewhere else at the time of the alleged 
crime. (R: 186; 63) 
While Mr. Gallup did not provide the State with written advance notice that 
he would testify he was somewhere else, the plain language of the alibi statute 
unequivocally provides that notwithstanding the notice requirement a defendant 
always has the right to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-14-2. The penalty for noncompliance with the notice provision is the 
exclusion of any witnesses the defendant would call or evidence he would 
otherwise offer to prove that alibi, but never his own testimony concerning alibi. 
This rule is the same in other jurisdictions. 
The right to testify is also a fundamental and constitutional right protected 
by and enshrined in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and its infraction can never be treated as harmless error. 
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Further, requiring Mr. Gallup to provide the State with written advance 
notice of his testimony violates his Fifth Amendment right against self 
incrimination. 
The prosecutor committed reversible error during the State's case-in-chief, 
cross-examination of Mr. Gallup, and closing argument, when he posed questions 
and made comments about Mr. Gallup's exercise of his right to remain silent in the 
face of police questioning. (R: 186; 35-36, 79-80, 82-83, 89) The trial court also 
committed error when it denied Mr. Gallup's motion to exclude that evidence and 
when it failed to sustain Mr. Gallup's later objection and give a curative 
instruction. (R: 186; 14-15, 89). 
The right to remain silent is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment and extends 
to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda noncustodial situations when witnesses and suspects are 
first contacted by law enforcement officers. Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the 
phone after the trooper called him, identified himself as a law enforcement officer, 
and asked Mr. Gallup questions about the incident. This constituted an invocation 
of his privilege against self incrimination. Mere silence should be sufficient to 
invoke the privilege, and no special combination of words should be required. 
At trial the prosecutor used Mr. Gallup's silence against him by expressly 
informing the jury that it showed he was guilty and had a "consciousness of guilt." 
(R: 186; 89) The prosecutor did not wait for Mr. Gallup to open the door by taking 
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the stand, but introduced that evidence during the State's case-in-chief. (R: 186; 
35-36) As a result, Mr. Gallup was compelled to waive his right under the Fifth 
Amendment, take the stand, and subject himself to cross-examination. (R: 186; 
52, 54, 56) 
These two errors considered alone or together, constitute reversible error 
because they are substantial and prejudicial. They are substantial because they 
divested Mr. Gallup of important statutory and constitutional rights such as the 
right to testify on one's own behalf concerning alibi, the right to testify in general, 
the due process of law, the right to confront witnesses, and the right against self 
incrimination and to remain silent in the face of police questioning. They are 
prejudicial because the State's one witness never specifically identified Mr. Gallup 
at the crime scene and the State relied heavily on the exclusion of Mr. Gallup's 
alibi defense as well as his silence in order to prove its case. Accordingly, this 
court should not have confidence in the outcome and the verdicts should be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
RESTRICTED MR. GALLUP'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY ON HIS OWN 
BEHALF CONCERNING WHERE HE WAS AT THE TIME THE 
ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED, WHEN THE ALIBI STATUTE 
PLAINLY STATES THAT NOTWITHSTANDING A DEFENDANT'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING 
ADVANCE NOTICE OF ALIBI, "THE DEFENDANT MAY ALWAYS 
TESTIFY ON HIS OWN BEHALF CONCERNING ALIBI" 
15 
The Utah alibi statute is found at Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 and states in 
pertinent part, 
A defendant. . . who intends 10 offer evidence of an alibi shall, not 
less than ten days before trial. . . file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice 
shall contain specific information as to the place where the defendant 
claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and . . . the 
names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to 
establish alibi. 
The statute then provides that, 
If a defendant. . . fails to comply with the requirements of this 
section, the court may exclude evidence offered to establish [] alibi. 
However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf 
concerning alibi. 
(Emphasis added). The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to testify on 
his own behalf concerning alibi is a question of statutory construction which the 
appellate court reviews de novo for correctness without deference to the trial 
court's interpretation. Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, % 10, 127 P. 2d 
246. When interpreting a statute the court must look first to the "plain language" 
of the statute to determine its meaning, and venture beyond the four comers of the 
statute only when its language is ambiguous. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P. 2d 561, 562-
63 (Utah 1996); see also State v. Johnson, 224 P. 3d 720, 728 (Utah App. 2009). 
In the instant case the statute is unambiguous. It provides that the sanction 
for failing to file a notice of alibi is the exclusion of extrinsic evidence offered to 
prove alibi such as - most commonly - witness testimony. It does not preclude the 
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defendant from testifying because the statute clearly and unambiguously states 
that, "however" i.e. notwithstanding his failure to comply with the notice 
requirements or, regardless of the fact that he did not provide notice, "the 
defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi." In other words, 
the defendant may always assert alibi during his own testimony on the witness 
stand even if he has not provided the State with advance written notice that he was 
intending to raise an alibi defense. The sanction for failure to comply is that he 
cannot call witnesses or offer additional evidence to prove that alibi. 
The case law and legal rules in this state and other jurisdictions support this 
interpretation. In State v. Maestas, 815 P. 2d 1319, 1325 (Utah App. 1991) this 
court held that since the defendant did not provide advance notice of alibi the trial 
court properly excluded testimony by any alibi witnesses. (Emphasis added). In 
People v. Peace, 256 A.D. 2d 1014, 683 NYS 2d 317 (3d Dept 1998) the court 
held that if it is only the defendant who testifies to being elsewhere than at the 
crime scene, no alibi notice is required. In People v. Cuevas, 67 A.D. 2d 219, 414 
NYS 2d 520 (1st Dept 1979) the court held that a defendant may always testify as 
to who he was with, though that particular witness may be barred from testifying. 
Further, Rule 14 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure governing 
pretrial discovery reads similar to the Utah statute when it states in part, 
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The judge may . . . order that the defendant serve upon the prosecutor 
a written notice . . . of his or her intention to offer a defense of alibi. 
The notice . . . shall state the specific place or places at which the 
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and 
the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defense 
intends to rely to establish the alibi. 
Upon the failure of either party to comply with the requirements 
of this rule, the judge may exclude the testimony of any 
undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the defendants 
absence from or presence at the scene of the alleged offense. This 
rule shall not limit the right of the defendant to testify. 
(Emphasis added). The plain meaning of the Utah alibi statute, like similar 
statutes and rules in other jurisdictions, is that a defendant's failure to comply with 
the notice requirement precludes him from offering extrinsic evidence to prove 
alibi - such as the testimony of additional witnesses - but it never precludes him 
from testifying on his own behalf concerning where he was on the date and time of 
the alleged crime. Therefore the trial committed error when it interpreted and 
applied the statute to the contrary and restricted Mr. Gallup's testimony so that he 
could not testify as to where he was on the date and time in question. 
In State v. Ortiz, 712 P. 2d 218 (Utah 1985) the court held that the 
overriding consideration in evaluating any notice of alibi claim must be the 
avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice, and not the exaltation of technical 
formalities. Further, in State v. Haddenham, 585 P. 2d 447 (Utah 1978) the court 
stated that the effect of not filing a notice of alibi witness (note how the court 
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described it) is largely discretionary with the court, which may waive the 
requirement for good cause shown. 
In the instant case Mr. Gallup did not suddenly announce that he intended to 
call any additional witnesses or offer extrinsic evidence to prove that he was 
somewhere else. The alibi consisted of his testimony only. The prosecutor was 
not surprised by this because Mr. Gallup had already pled not guilty, had obviously 
notified the court and prosecutor of his intention to go to trial and contest the 
charges, and it was the prosecutor - not the defense - who first raised the alibi issue 
just after Mr. Gallup stated his intention to take the stand and testify. Therefore the 
prosecutor was already aware that if Mr. Gallup testified he would most probably 
deny being the driver of the vehicle and that he would testify that he was 
somewhere else. The prosecutor merely raised an objection to a technical 
formality at the last minute and the court incorrectly sustained him. 
Further, even if the court correctly held that the alibi statute precluded Mr. 
Gallup from testifying about alibi, it abused its discretion in not waiving the 
requirement for good cause when Mr. Gallup informed the court that his decision 
to testify was a last minute one based on the court's earlier denial of his motion to 
exclude introduction of the phone call between him and the trooper, as well as the 
court thereby permitting the prosecutor to question the trooper about Mr. Gallup's 
silence during the State's case-in-chief. (R: 186; 55-56) The court should have 
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waived the notice requirement for good cause shown and its failure to do so 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
The court's error - not allowing Mr. Gallup to testify on his own behalf 
concerning alibi - is reversible because it was substantial and prejudicial. State v. 
Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 22, 69 P. 3d 838. It was substantial because it 
prevented him from fully testifying from the stand, explaining his version of the 
facts, and confronting the witnesses and accusations leveled against him. This is 
not only a statutory right but, as explained below, it is also a fundamental and 
constitutional one. Further, the error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable 
likelihood that without it there may have been a different result, and that likelihood 
is high enough to undermine the appellate court's confidence in the verdict. State 
v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, \ 37, 224 P. 3d 720; see also State v. Ott, 2010 UT 
1, f 40. There were only two witnesses at the trial, the trooper and Mr. Gallup, and 
at the end of the trial during deliberation the jury was curious enough to ask the 
court why Mr. Gallup had not testifying concerning his whereabouts on the night 
in question. The court told the jury that it had previously excluded the introduction 
of that evidence. (R: 186; 93-94) The only evidence the State had against Mr. 
Gallup was that he was the registered owner of the vehicle and that the trooper had 
very briefly identified the driver as a man with brown hair in this thirties. (R: 186; 
28, 33, 49) The trooper admitted this description could easily describe a lot of 
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people in the population and that he made this brief identification at night from just 
behind the rear passenger side door of the vehicle and through tinted windows 
without the benefit of his flashlight. (R: 186; 22, 26-28, 40-42, 49) 
Excluding Mr. Gallup's testimony concerning alibi was a substantial 
violation of his statutory and constitutional right to testify and he was prejudiced 
because its exclusion significantly strengthened the State's case against him given 
the scant evidence in its possession. As a result, there is a reasonable and high 
likelihood that the verdict may have been different had Mr. Gallup been permitted 
to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi, especially considering that during 
deliberation the jury asked the court a question about his alibi. Therefore, Mr. 
Gallup's conviction should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ALIBI STATUTE 
REQUIRING MR. GALLUP TO GIVE THE STATE ADVANCE WRITTEN 
NOTICE OF THE CONTENT OF HIS OWN TESTIMONY BECAUSE IT 
INCLUDED AN ALIBI DEFENSE, AND PREVENTING HIM FROM 
TESTIFYING ON HIS OWN BEHALF CONCERNING ALIBI WHEN HE 
FAILED TO GIVE SUCH NOTICE, CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF 
MR. GALLUP'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
In the case of Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct 2704, 97 L. Ed 2d 37 
(1987) the United States Supreme Court held that there is a constitutional right to 
testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial, and that while this right to testify is 
not without limitation, any restrictions placed upon it may not be arbitrary or 
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In Specht v. Patterson, 
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386 U.S. 605, 87 S. Ct 1209, 18 L. Ed 2d 326 (1967) the same court held that the 
right of an accused to be heard on his own behalf is a fundamental principle of 
modern jurisprudence and that, at a minimum, due process requires that a 
defendant in a criminal case have an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence 
of his own. In State v. Morehouse, 748 P. 2d 217 (Utah App. 1988) this court held 
that the defendant's right to testify in a criminal proceeding against him is so basic 
to a fair trial that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error. Id. at 223. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
provide that a person cannot be deprived of his or her liberty without the due 
process of law, and the above cited cases apply these due process principles to 
defendants in a criminal proceeding by providing that every defendant receive a 
fair trial and enjoy his or her day in court. While a defendant who fails to satisfy 
the notice requirements of the Utah alibi statute can be precluded from offering 
evidence to prove alibi, the fundamental constitutional right under the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to offer evidence on his own 
behalf and by his own testimony, tending to establish his innocence (whether or 
not he asserts alibi) cannot and should not be abridged as a penalty for 
noncompliance with the statute. Indeed, the Utah alibi statute recognizes this 
constitutional right and expressly enshrines it when it states that, "However, the 
defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi." (Emphasis 
added) The statutory penalty for noncompliance is exclusion of the testimony of 
those witnesses the defendant would otherwise call to establish the alibi, but never 
his own testimony concerning alibi. Rule 14 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure says exactly the same thing when it states that "this rule shall 
not limit the right of the defendant to testify." These cases, statutes and rules 
provide that while excluding the testimony of additional witnesses to prove alibi is 
an appropriate sanction for noncompliance, limiting the defendant's testimony 
concerning alibi is an arbitrary and disproportionate limitation on his constitutional 
right to take the stand and testify. By restricting Mr. Gallup's statutory and 
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf concerning alibi the trial court 
denied Mr. Gallup a fair trial and an opportunity to be heard and confront the 
witnesses and evidence against him. He was subsequently found guilty and 
incarcerated and therefore deprived of his liberty without the due process of law. 
Finally, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "no person . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
Therefore, the trial court's interpretation of the statute requiring Mr. Gallup to give 
written advance notice of his own testimony to the State violated his right against 
self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and the court's order precluding 
him from testifying as to where he was at the time of the alleged crime because of 
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his failure to provide said notice violated his right to due process under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
In conclusion, this court should find as a matter of constitutional 
jurisprudence that an accused individual may always testify concerning where he 
was at the time of the alleged crime, and that he is not required to give the State 
advance notice of his own testimony. The trial court erred and the error is 
prejudicial and reversible for all the same reasons outlined at the end of part one of 
this argument. However, this court has already held that the defendant's right to 
testify in a criminal proceeding against him is so basic to a fair trial that its 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error. See Morehouse, 748 P. 2d at 223. 
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S INNAPROPRIATE QUESTIONS AND 
COMMENTS DURING HIS CASE-IN-CHIEF, CROSS EXAMINATION OF 
MR. GALLUP, AND CLOSING ARGUMENT, CONCERNING MR. 
GALLUP'S EXERCISE OF HIS PRE-ARREST RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT WHILE BEING INVESTIGATED FOR A CRIME, VIOLATED 
MR. GALLUP'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF 
INCRIMINATION 
The issue is whether the prosecutor improperly used Mr. Gallup's pre-arrest 
silence against him at trial. While there is a plethora of case law surrounding the 
issue of post-Miranda, post-arrest silence, the case law concerning pre-Miranda, 
pre-arrest silence is more limited. Fortunately, courts in various jurisdictions, 
including Utah and the Tenth Circuit, have affirmatively held that a criminal 
defendant's pre-arrest silence cannot be used against him. These courts have held 
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that pre-arrest silence is inadmissible because admitting pre-arrest silence would 
pressure defendants to take the witness stand at trial in order to explain their prior 
silence. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F. 3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that if a 
defendant cannot avoid introduction of his prior silence by refusing to testify, he 
would be under substantial pressure to waive the privilege against self 
incrimination later at trial in order to explain his silence). This creates a "veritable 
Catch 22." See State v. Fend, 325 N.W. 2d 703, 711 (Wis. 1982); see also State v. 
Leach, 807 N.E. 2d 335, 341 (Ohio 2004) (holding that use of pre-arrest silence 
would force a defendant to either permit the jury to infer guilt from his silence or 
otherwise surrender his right not to testify). Permitting prosecutors to use a 
defendant's pre-arrest silence against him would mean that suspects and witnesses 
in criminal investigations would be compelled to speak, and thereby incriminate 
themselves when first contacted by law enforcement, effectively leading to a police 
state. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S 231, 250 (1980); see also State v. Easter, 
922 P. 2d 1285, 1290 (Wash, 1996) (holding that a defendant has effectively lost 
his right to remain silent when the state may later comment that he did not speak 
up prior to arrest). 
In United States v. Burson, 952 F. 2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991) the trial court 
admitted testimony by two IRS criminal investigators concerning the defendant's 
silence when questioned by them. The defendant was convicted and he 
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subsequently appealed. The circuit court stated that the invocation of the privilege 
against self incrimination must be given a liberal construction, that it does not 
require any special combination of words, and that it can be asserted in any 
investigatory proceeding regardless of whether the person being questioned has 
been arrested, is in custody, or has been informed of his rights under Miranda. 
Applying these principles the court stated that mere silence in the face of 
questioning by law enforcement officers constitutes an invocation of the privilege 
against self incrimination. Id. at 1200-1201. The court held, citing the Griffin rule, 
that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent it is impermissible for the 
prosecution to subsequently make reference to it. Id. Finally, having found error, 
the court stated that there are five factors to consider in determining whether 
prosecutorial questioning and comments on a defendant's pre-arrest silence 
constitute reversible error. First, the way in which the prosecution used the 
defendant's silence (e.g. cross-examining the defendant concerning his silence for 
impeachment purposes 'once' he surrenders his privilege by taking the witness 
stand and testifying is permissible in limited circumstances); second, who elected 
to pursue the line of questioning; third, the quantum of other evidence indicative of 
guilt; fourth, the intensity and frequency of the reference; and fifth, the availability 
of the trial judge of an opportunity to grant a motion for a mistrial or give curative 
instructions. Id. Ultimately in Burson the court found harmless error because the 
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IRS agents did not testify as to any of the questions they propounded to the 
defendant, the prosecution made no reference to the defendant's silence in closing 
argument, and the record evidenced a sincere and active concern by the trial court 
to protect the defendant. Id. at 1201. 
In 1993 this court had the opportunity to visit the issue of pre-arrest silence 
in the case of State v. Palmer, 860 P. 2d 339 (Utah App. 1993). In this case 
testimony implicating the defendant's pre-arrest silence when questioned by a 
detective was admitted into evidence during the State's case-in-chief, cross-
examination of the defendant, and closing argument. The prosecutor argued that 
the defendant's choice to remain silent showed a "consciousness of guilt." He also 
made statements in closing such as, "what is so incredibly difficult about saying, 
'No, I didn't do it?' Why didn't he do that? Because he knows he was guilty, that's 
why." The jury subsequently convicted him. Id. at 341-42, 346. On appeal this 
court held that evidence of the defendant's pre-Miranda, pre-arrest silence was not 
admissible to demonstrate that the defendant had consciousness of guilt and 
therefore violated his right against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. at 349-50. In reaching this conclusion the court stated that the privilege against 
self incrimination is based on numerous social policies, among them, 
"our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system 
of criminal justice . . . our sense of fair play which dictates 4a fair 
state-individual balance . . . by requiring the government in its contest 
with the individual to shoulder the entire load' . . . our respect for . . . 
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the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a 
private life' . . . [and] our realization that the privilege, while 
sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty/ is often 'a protection to the 
innocent.'" 
Id. at 347. The court further stated that the privilege could be asserted in any 
type of proceeding, including the investigatory phase of a crime before arrest, 
custody or Miranda warnings, and could apply to "any disclosures which the 
witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or 
which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." Id. The court noted 
that while the prosecution may use a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
for impeachment purposes on cross-examination, such questioning is permitted 
only after the defendant 'opens the door' by taking the witness stand, and that the 
mere act of taking the stand does not independently make the defendant's silence 
relevant. Id. at 348. See also United States v. Caro, 637 F. 2d 869 (2nd Cir. 1981) 
(holding that a suspect's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence cannot be used in the 
government's case-in-chief). The court also stated that the test used for 
determining whether the prosecutor's remarks are improper and constitute error is 
whether those remarks called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not 
normally be justified in considering in reaching a verdict. The court held that 
improper statements will require reversal if they are determined to be harmful. Id. 
at 342; see also State v. Emmett, 839 P. 2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). 
28 
In the instant case Mr. Gallup had previously moved the court to exclude 
testimony by the trooper that he remained silent and hung up the phone after the 
trooper identified himself as a law enforcement officer and told Mr. Gallup that he 
wanted to meet with him to talk to and question him about an incident. (R: 186; 
14-15) The court overruled the motion and the State went on to use Mr. Gallup's 
silence against him at trial, ultimately culminating in guilty verdicts. Id. This was 
error. The Tenth Circuit has held that mere silence in the face of police 
questioning by law enforcement officers constitutes an invocation of the right 
against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. See Burson, 952 F. 2d at 
1200-1201. Further, this court has held that the right extends to the investigatory 
phase of a crime before arrest and to any disclosures which a suspect or witness 
may reasonably believe could be used against him. See Palmer, 860 P. 2d at 347; 
see also Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1200-01 (holding that the right can be asserted in any 
investigatory proceeding regardless of whether the person being questioned has 
been arrested). The circuit court in Burson and this court in Palmer both found 
that the Griffin rule, making it impermissible for the prosecution to refer to the 
defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda exercise of his right to remain silent also 
applied once the defendant invoked that right, even if by the act of mere silence in 
the face of police questioning, to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda situations. Id. 
Obviously, Mr. Gallup was not in custody when the trooper questioned him 
because he was being questioned by the trooper over the phone and the trooper had 
no idea where Mr. Gallup was. (R: 186; 35-36) However, the trooper had first 
identified himself to Mr. Gallup as a law enforcement officer "with Highway 
Patrol" and told Mr. Gallup that he wanted to know his location so that he could 
meet with and "talk" to him "about an incident." (R: 186; 36). This situation is 
similar to that in Burson when the two IRS agents questioned the defendant in a 
noncustodial investigatory setting. Like the defendant in that case Mr. Gallup was 
entitled to exercise his right to remain silent in the face of questioning even if by 
the act of mere silence. This is what Mr. Gallup did when he remained silent and 
then hung up the phone. (R: 186; 36) The right should be given a liberal 
construction (applying it to initial noncustodial contact with law enforcement) and 
it should not require any special combination of words (mere silence in the face of 
police questioning should be sufficient). See Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1200-01. 
While a defendant's silence is admissible in limited circumstances to 
impeach him on cross-examination, it is not admissible as part of the State's direct 
case or to demonstrate consciousness of guilt, See Palmer, 860 P. 2d at 347. 
However, this is exactly what the prosecution did after the court denied Mr. 
Gallup's motion. The prosecutor elicited testimony from the trooper concerning 
Mr. Gallup's silence during the State's case-in-chief, and before Mr. Gallup 
opened the door by deciding to take the stand and testify. (R: 186; 35-36). During 
cross-examination the prosecutor repeatedly badgered Mr. Gallup about his 
silence, impliedly suggesting to the jury that Mr. Gallup would not have remained 
silent had he been innocent. (R: 186; 79-80) During closing the prosecutor 
expressly told the jury that Mr. Gallup's silence in the face of police questioning 
showed that he had a guilty consciousness. He told the jury, "Hanging up the 
phone, ladies and gentleman, showed his consciousness of guilt." (R: 186; 89). 
These are the last words the jury heard before retiring to the jury room to 
deliberate. Id. In Palmer the prosecutor argued in closing that the defendant's 
choice to remain silent showed a "consciousness of guilt." See Palmer, 860 P. 2d 
at 341-42, 346. These are the exact words the prosecutor used in the instance case 
("Hanging up the phone, ladies and gentlemen, showed his consciousness of 
guilt"), (R: 186; 89), and in Palmer the court held that such a statement made at 
closing was inappropriate and therefore reversible error. Id. There are other 
similarities between the two cases. In Palmer the prosecutor commented to the 
jury that, "what is so incredibly difficult about saying, 'No, I didn't do it? Why 
didn't he do that? Because he knows he was guilty, that's why.'" Id. In the instant 
case the prosecutor told the jury, "If there was some sort of explanation he could 
offer . . . that was the opportunity to t e l l . . . and he didn't," "he failed to take that 
opportunity to talk to the officer about the incident, to explain it away somehow" 
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and "as a result . . . I say you find him guilty." (R: 186; 82-83). The prosecutor 
also told the jury, "is that reasonable to believe tha t . . . he was just exercising his 
right to remain silent. . . did he say, T decided to exercise my right to remain 
silent?'" (R: 186; 89). However, as already stated, invocation of the right against 
self incrimination requires no special combination of words and mere silence is 
sufficient. See Bur son, 952 F. 2d at 1200-01. Further, applying the Griffin rule, it 
is impermissible for the prosecution to even refer to any Fifth Amendment right 
during trial once that right has been invoked and even if the accused did not use the 
words, "Fifth Amendment" or "right to remain silent." Id. 
As well as following the rules and precedents established by the 
aforementioned case law, this court should make it inappropriate as a matter of 
sound public policy for the State to comment, during its direct case and closing 
argument, on a defendant's pre-arrest silence. The case law recognizes that 
admitting pre-arrest silence puts defendants in a Catch 22 situation. They either 
permit the jury to infer guilt from silence or they else waive their Fifth Amendment 
right against self incrimination, take the stand, and testify thereby subjecting 
themselves to cross-examination concerning their prior silence. See Combs v. 
Coyle, 205 F. 3d at 285; see also Fend, 325 N.W. 2d at 711; Leach, 807 N.E. 2d at 
341; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S at 250; Easter, 922 P. 2d at 1290. This is 
exactly what happened to Mr. Gallup, who decided to take the stand and testify at 
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the last minute after the court denied his motion to exclude evidence of the phone 
call between him and the trooper, including the fact that he remained silent and 
hung up the phone after the trooper identified himself and posed questions to Mr. 
Gallup. (R: 186;14-15, 52,54-56). Permitting the State to get away with making 
such comments during trial would mean that all witnesses and suspects would feel 
compelled to speak when first contacted by law enforcement. This would lead to a 
police state and effectively destroy the right to remain silent in any pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda situation, which is what happened to Mr. Gallup. This court addressed 
that concern when it stated that, "merely because an individual does not need to be 
advised of his right to remain silent until he is subject to a custodial interrogation 
does not mean he should be penalized for invoking that right earlier" and that 
allowing prosecutors to use such silence later on in court "would encourage the 
authorities to refrain from issuing Miranda warnings as long as possible in an 
attempt to generate either inferential evidence of guilt from silence or an admission 
prior to custodial interrogation." The court surmised that, "providing law 
enforcement an incentive to withhold Miranda warnings would be poor public 
policy and contrary to the spirit of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence." See Palmer, 
860 P. 2d at 349. 
As stated above, the privilege against self incrimination is based on 
numerous social policies such as preference for an accusatorial system rather than 
an inquisitorial one, a fair balance between the state and the individual, requiring 
the government to shoulder the burden of proof, and the right of the individual to a 
private enclave where he may lead a private life. Id. at 347. In the instant case the 
prosecutor's comments suggested to the jury that Mr. Gallup should have spoken 
up when first questioned by law enforcement, that he should have spoken up in a 
an effort to prove his innocence, and that he really was not entitled to retreat 
behind his private enclave or private life when questioned by law enforcement. 
This approach is reminiscent of the Napoleonic inquisitorial system of justice 
where the defendant shoulders the burden of proving his innocence and where 
individual rights are merely privileges bestowed by the state, rather than principles 
of natural law enshrined in written constitutions. It stands in stark contrast to the 
Anglo-American system in which the individual enjoys natural rights and where 
the state always carries the burden of proof. 
The prosecutor's comments constitute reversible error. In Bur son the court 
held that there are five factors to consider in determining whether the prosecutors 
comments constitute reversible error, namely, the way in which the prosecution 
used the defendant's silence, who elected to pursue the line of questioning, the 
quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt, the intensity and frequency of the 
comments, and the trial court's opportunity to give curative instructions or grant a 
mistrial. Id. at 1201. In the instant case it was the prosecutor who introduced 
evidence concerning Mr. Gallup's silence during the State's case-in-chief, (R: 186; 
36-35) and he used it to impliedly and expressly suggest that Mr. Gallup's silence 
meant he was guilty. (R: 186; 82-83, 89). The prosecutor's made these comments 
with much frequency during his case-in-chief, on cross-examination, and during 
his closing and rebuttal arguments. (R: 186; 35-36, 79-80, 82-83, 89). The 
questions and comments were intense. On cross he asked Mr. Gallup, "didn't it 
seem important to talk to the officer . . . about the incident?", "didn't it seem 
important to ask the officer more about what he was calling about?", "did you ask 
the officer, 'hey, why are you calling me?", "why didn't you respond?", "why did 
you hang up?" and "did you then follow up with him . . . and ask more questions, 
or did you just hang up on him?" (R: 186; 79-80) During closing and rebuttal he 
made comments like, "if there was some sort of explanation he could offer [the 
trooper] to get him away from realizing that he was the real driver, that was the 
opportunity to tell [], and he didn't," "when he had an opportunity within [] an 
hour of the incident, he failed to take that opportunity to talk to the officer about 
the incident, to explain it away somehow," "as a result. . . I say you find him 
guilty," "he hung up the phone. Is that reasonable to believe that . . . he was just 
exercising his right to remain silent?" "Did he say, 'I decided to exercise my right 
to remain silent?" and "Hanging up the phone, ladies and gentlemen, showed his 
consciousness of guilt." (R: 186; 82-83, 89) Mr. Gallup objected to these 
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comments but the court overruled him while at the same time stating, "Although I 
think enough's been said." Id. This can hardly be considered a curative 
instruction. Further, there was very little other evidence which the State had to 
prove that Mr. Gallup was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trooper merely 
identified the driver as a white man with brown hair in his mid thirties. He readily 
admitted this description would apply to a lot of people. It was made very briefly 
at night from just behind the rear passenger side door and through tinted windows. 
The rearview mirror was positioned so that he could not see the reflection of the 
driver's face. The trooper had forgotten to turn on his flashlight, and his overhead 
spot light created a silhouette effect. (R: 186; 25-31, 40-42, 49) The only 
evidence he had implicating Mr. Gallup was that he was the registered owner of 
the vehicle, (R: 186; 33) and the fact that Mr. Gallup was silent and hung up the 
phone after he questioned him (R: 186; 35-36, 77). This probably explains why he 
waited almost five months to finally charge Mr. Gallup. (R: 186; 44). The trooper 
stated that the case had been weighing on him and that he needed to talk to a lot of 
people about it. (R: 186; 44). Also, unlike the court in Burson which found 
harmless error because the prosecution made no reference to the defendant's 
silence in closing and the record evidenced a sincere and active concern by the trial 
court to protect the defendant, Id. at 1201, here the prosecutor did make reference 
to Mr. Gallup's silence during closing, and the record is devoid of any effort by the 
trial court to protect Mr. Gallup's constitutional rights. 
The error is substantial and prejudicial. It divested Mr. Gallup of his right to 
remain silent and lent heavily to the State's case against him, especially 
considering that the evidence they did have - a brief generic identification coupled 
with the fact that Mr. Gallup was the registered owner of the suspect vehicle - may 
not have been sufficient to prove that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
operating the vehicle on the night in question. It is no wonder the State sought to 
use his silence against him and prevent him from testifying as to where he was. Its 
case may have been even harder to prove had Mr. Gallup not taken the stand and 
subjected himself to cross-examination. However, the court incorrectly permitted 
the State to question the trooper about Mr. Gallup's silence during its case-in-chief, 
and therefore Mr. Gallup was compelled to waive his privilege against self 
incrimination and take the stand to testify. The court then severely restricted his 
testimony while at the same time allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him 
about his silence. Most if not all of the prosecutor's questions on cross pertained 
to the issue of Mr. Gallup's silence and it was the fact of his silence that the 
prosecutor emphasized to the jury when he told them during closing that as a result 
of Mr. Gallup's silence "I say you find him guilty" and that his silence "showed his 
consciousness of guilt." (R: 186; 83, 89) When a constitutional violation has 
17 
occurred it is the state which "bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
improperly [admitted evidence] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," see 
State v. Morrison, 937 P. 2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997) and "did not contribute 
to the guilty verdict." See Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1201. In the instant case it is 
highly unlikely given the facts that the State could prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that admission of Mr. Gallup's silence during the State's case-in-chief, cross-
examination of Mr. Gallup, and closing argument, did not contribute to the guilty 
verdicts. Therefore, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and 
there is a reasonably high likelihood that absent those questions and comments by 
the prosecutor there may have been a different result, thereby undermining this 
court's confidence in the final verdict. See State v. Harmon, 956 P. 2d 262, 268 
(Utah 1998); see also State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 22, 69 P. 3d 838; State v. 
Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, 1 37, 224 P. 3d 720; State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, If 40; 
State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); Burson, 952 F. 2d at 1201. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this court should reverse Mr. Gallup's convictions. 
DATED this 4 day of October, 2010 _ 
Anthony V. Rippa/Brook J. Sessions 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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1 you're going to need to object again to preserve your objection 
2 I consider your objection preserved. 
3 MR. SESSIONS: Okay, and then I also wanted to preserve 
4 an objection as to the officer testifying that my client just 
5 hung up on them without further conversation. My argument on 
6 that -- I brought up a little bit in chambers, but I wanted to 
7 make sure I do it on the record -- is that my client has a 
8 right against self-incrimination. 
9 Obviously when he hangs up, he's not making any 
10 statements and he's exercising that right against self-
11 incrimination. Realizing he's not in custody at that point 
12 because he's over the phone, but whether he's in custody or 
13 not he has a right to not incriminate himself and not make 
14 statements. 
15 So by the officer testifying that he made a call and 
16 the defendant hung up on him, I believe that that insinuates 
17 that my client was guilty in some way. So it's my argument 
18 that it's inappropriate for that to be commented upon. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Johnson. 
20 MR. JOHNSON: I think, Judge, that under the Rules of 
21 Evidence, I still think it comes in as either an admission or 
22 that it's not hearsay at all by his action of hanging up. I 
23 think, you know, verbally saying something, "This is Jeffery," 
24 that's clearly a verbal statement. That would be an admission. 
25 Silence can be interpreted as an admission. Again, I 
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k it's from the defendant. It's contemporaneous with the 
conversation It's not like the person said, "H ere, talk to 
so and so," and then that person is silent. I think it's all 
cont emporaneous. I think it comes in under the 
Again, he wasn't in custody so there wasn't any 
issue. I know he concedes that, but I think it' 
the 
the 
totality 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
Rules of 
conversation 
that portion 
objection. 
the 
for 
Judg 
MR. 
time the 
THE 
purposes 
MR. 
THE 
-MR. 
THE 
of that conversation, however brief 
COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sessions? 
SESSIONS: No, I'll submit it. 
COURT: I don't know anything under 
Evidence that would preclude that p 
r or that action from coming in. Sc 
of the testimony to come in, and I' 
SESSIONS: Okay, and I won't make tl 
testimony comes in. 
COURT: Okay, yeah, your objections 
of appeal. 
JOHNSON: That's all that the State 
COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
SESSIONS: No. 
COURT: Okay, let's take our recess, 
e Davis's courtroom we're going to be in. 
MR. 
THE 
JOHNSON: Okay, 301? 
COURT: Yeah, 301. Okay, so let's g 
hearsay rule. 
sort of Miranda 
s admissible, 
it was. 
the case law or 
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I will allow 
11 note your 
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find that these are business records. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. JOHNSON: Did you -- after looking at the 
picture of Mr. Gallup that evening, did that seem consistent 
with the brief description that you saw from the back of the 
driver of the vehicle that day? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. Were you -- did you conduct an investigation further 
into contacting Mr. Gallup that evening? 
A. I did. 
Q. I'm just going to -- if you can just answer the 
question --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- so we can steer the jury the right way. Did you 
obtain a phone number that belonged to the defendant that 
night? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What did you do with that number? 
A. I called that number from my office. 
Q. Okay, how long after this incident? 
A. It was probably -- approximately an hour. 
Q. Okay. 
A. About that, I would think. 
Q. Okay, and can you describe the substance of the phone 
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call to the jury, what happened when you called that number? 
A. Yes. A male answered the phone, and I simply asked 
-- in fact, I said, "Is Mr. Jeffery Gallup there, please." 
The male voice on the other end of the phone said, "This is 
Jeffery." 
Q. Okay. 
A. At that point I explained who I was. "I'm Trooper 
Clanton with the Highway Patrol, and I was wondering if you 
could tell me your location. I'd like to meet with you for 
just a few minutes and talk to you about an incident," and 
there was -- and then at that point there was a brief moment 
of silence, possibly a second or so, and then the conversation 
ended. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The person on the other end of the phone hung up the 
phone. 
Q. So he hung up on you? 
A. Correct. 
Q. He didn't say, "Hey, I'm glad you called. I wanted to 
talk to you. Someone has my car," anything like that? 
A. -No. 
Q. Just hung up on you? 
A. Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay, that's all I have for this witness. 
Thank you. 
-52-
1 them. I've met with my client and --
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. SESSIONS: -- I just need a few minutes to go 
4 through them. I think most of them are standard instructions. 
5 THE COURT: Right. 
6 MR. SESSIONS: We have gone over most of them in 
7 chambers. 
8 THE COURT: The ones that had issues. 
9 MR. SESSIONS: Right. 
10 (Court speaks with clerk off the record) 
11 MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I've looked through the 
12 instructions. I've talked with my client, and it's his intent 
13 to testify. So I think that we can take out the instruction 
14 regarding the defendant is not required to testify. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, do you want us to put back in the one 
16 that says he's a competent witness? 
17 MR. SESSIONS: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: All right, so we'll pull out that one, and 
19 I'll have Jenny print out the other one again. Well, we have 
20 two options from the two of you. I think they were a little 
21 bit different. 
22 MR. JOHNSON: On the whether he testifies instruction? 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. One was from Tom, and one was from 
24 you. They were just a little bit different. 
25 MR. JOHNSON: Judge, just since we have time to kill or 
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whatever, I'm -- the State is concerned, certainly, if he's 
testifying that the State has not received any notice of alibi, 
if that's -- I think -- I don't know any other way to not go 
into that. 
THE COURT: Let's get a microphone there. Yeah. So 
your concern is that his testimony may --
MR. JOHNSON: I think, unless he asks him what time 
of day it is today or something, that if he talks about the 
incident, it's going to necessarily implicate whether or not he 
was present in the vehicle; and if not, then he's talking about 
an alibi defense. That's news to the State as of January 5th at 
12:20. So I think under the rule 77-14-2, that we need to have 
that notice at least ten days before trial, so we can research 
and investigate what he may be claiming. 
THE COURT: It's a valid concern, Mr. Sessions. Is 
your client going to -- with regard to the incident, not the 
phone call, I assume, but with regard to the incident, is he 
going to testify with regard to anything that would be an 
alibi, indicating he wasn't in the car that night? Because 
if it goes that direction, I think the State's correct; it's 
an alibi ^  
MR. SESSIONS: I think --
THE COURT: I guess the second question is, is he also 
intending to testify about the telephone call. Hypothetically, 
if that was all he wanted to testify about, I think I would 
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time as the Court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim alibi. 
The notice shall contain specific information as to the place 
where the defendant claims to have been at the alleged offense 
-- time of the alleged offense, and as particularly as it's 
known to the defendant or his attorney the names and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he purposed to establish that alibi." 
Then it goes into what our duty is of the State to rebut that. 
Under subsection (3) "If a defendant or prosecuting 
attorney fails to comply with the requirements of the section, 
the Court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut 
alibi. However the defendant may always testify on his own 
behalf concerning alibi." 
Then under subsection (4), it says, "The Court may, 
for good cause shown, waive the requirements of the section." 
The State would argue there is no good cause. This has been 
going on for a while. 
THE COURT: Do you want me to get a copy of the code so 
you can look at the whole thing? 
MR. SESSIONS: We need to look at that, because it 
sounds to me like the defendant can always testify, according 
to that code section. Let me just be a little more clear, 
too, because I had not intended that my client would need to 
testify. If I had been successful on the objection to the 
foundation and the phone call evidence coming in, he would 
-59-
1 MR. SESSIONS: But if he just says, MI wasn't there. I 
2 think I was at this location, but nobody was there," that's an 
3 explanation but not an alibi, as I would understand alibi in 
4 the statute. 
5 THE COURT: Well, but if he says, "I was at another 
6 location," and that notice had been given, they could go to 
7 that location and investigate. 
8 MR. SESSIONS: But if he says, "I was at my home that 
9 night," how would they be able to go to that location --
10 MR. JOHNSON: Well, because --
11 MR. SESSIONS: -- and know he was there or not there on 
12 that night? 
13 MR. JOHNSON: Well, because the officers actually did, 
14 and he wasn't there. So -- but we did do that. So he can say 
15 that if he wants. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. SESSIONS: And we'll go to there. 
18 THE COURT: So as far as any testimony that places him 
19 definitely somewhere else, I think that constitutes at least a 
20 partial alibi; and notice should have been given to the State 
21 so that they could either check out that story or not, as the 
22 case may be. 
23 Now apparently there's testimony that the officer 
24 could give that hasn't been given, that they went to the home 
25 that night? 
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1 for sure I wasn't there. I wasn't in Utah County. I wasn't 
2 driving," it seems to speak out both sides of his mouth, and 
3 that's where --
4 THE COURT: I don't think you can have it both ways, 
5 Mr. Sessions. 
6 MR. SESSIONS: Pardon me? 
7 THE COURT: I think you can have it both ways. I think 
8 he either testifies he doesn't have a memory or he doesn't know 
9 where he was that night, or he doesn't testify as to where he 
10 was that night, because if he is going to say, "I was at a 
11 specific place that night," then the State should have had 
12 notice and should have had an opportunity to do whatever 
13 investigation they wanted to do in order to try and either 
14 corroborate his story, or to debunk his story; but I don't --
15 I don't think he can have it both ways. So that's his choice. 
16 MR. SESSIONS: Well, your Honor, I would argue that 
17 the defendant always does have the right to explain himself, 
18 because he is the defendant in a criminal case and has that 
19 right. That's an exception in the statute. 
20 I would also argue that simply not knowing where you 
21 are specifically doesn't mean that you can't exclude other 
22 places. He could say, "Well, I know I wasn't in Switzerland 
23 that night, because I've never been to Switzerland." He could 
24 say, "I know I wasn't in Utah County, because I had no reason 
25 to go to Utah County." "I know I wasn't in Canada, but I don't 
-62-
1 know exactly where I was. I was somewhere else." 
2 I believe that he should be allowed to testify to 
3 that, because he should be allowed to answer the questions 
4 against him. I understand the alibi statute is in place so 
5 that the officers can do an appropriate investigation, but also 
6 the defendant doesn't have a burden of proof, and the defendant 
7 has the right to remain silent. The defendant doesn't have to 
8 help the officers in all of their investigation. 
9 I would argue that if he has a specific location and a 
10 specific person who that they could check out, that it would be 
11 reasonable for them to check out, then the statute requires him 
12 to divulge that information; but if he had general information 
13 that says, "I don't know where I was, but I wasn't there," that 
14 is a reasonable testimony from a defendant. 
15 THE COURT: No, that's different from what I was saying. 
16 I MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, what I was saying is, sure, if he 
18 says -- well, I was working on the assumption that he was going 
19 to say he was specifically somewhere else. I guess if his 
20 testimony is, XVI just know I wasn't on the freeway that night. 
21 I don't know where I was, but I wasn't on the freeway that 
22 night," I th ink that's probably allowable. 
23 MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: But if he starts to establish that he was 
25 someplace where they could have investigated, that becomes an 
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alibi, in my opinion. 
MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I don't read the 
I don't read the sentence "However, 
testify on his own behalf concerning 
negates the previous two paragraphs. 
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-- be quiet, Mr. Gallup. 
the defendant may always 
alibi" as something that 
I think that just simply 
means if he wants to establish his own alibi and doesn' 
other witnesses he may do so, but he 
So in his testimony today, 
say either "I don't have a memory of 
I wasn't on the freeway that night; 
but I wasn't on the freeway," I mean 
blanket denial that he was speeding, 
precludes him from doing that. 
I would strike any testimon 
a place where he was that night, as 
freeway at the time the officer was 
vehicle that was registered to him. 
still has to give 
if he wants to get 
where I was," or x 
don't know where I 
, if he just wants 
I don't think the 
t have 
notice. 
up and 
VI know 
was, 
to do a 
statute 
y that starts to establish 
opposed to being on the 
chasing this particular 
Otherwise, that approaches 
an alibi and notice has not been given, okay? So have 
worked our way through that one? 
-(Counsel conferring off the record) 
we 
THE COURT: I'm ready to move on, folks. We've got a 
jury coming back in less then 50 minutes. Okay, as to 
instructions, I am a little concerne 
the jury 
d, since identity is not --
identity is very important in this case, we don't have a long 
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1 A. I do not know. I haven't --
2 Q. This is your car, right, that we're talking about on 
3 that night? 
4 A. That's correct, the car is registered to me. 
5 Q. And you spoke to the officer about an hour after that 
6 incident, when he called you briefly, as you said, right? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. At that point didn't it seem important to talk to the 
9 officer a little more about the incident and figure out what he 
10 was talking about? 
11 A. I was --
12 Q. That's a "yes" or "no" question. 
13 A. At that time, no. 
14 Q. Didn't seem important to ask the officer more about 
15 what he was calling you about? 
16 A. At that time, no, I did not know why he was calling 
17 me. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you ask the officer, "Hey, why are you 
19 calling me?" 
20 A. I did not, and he did not relate that to me. 
21 Q. -Okay, did he -- why didn't you respond to him when he 
22 said, "This is Trooper Clanton. I've been on the freeway. I 
23 want to talk to you about some events that happened tonight"? 
24 A. I bel --
25 Q. Why did you hang up on him? 
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1 A. I was under the impression he was calling on another 
2 matter. 
3 Q. Okay, so did you then follow up with him about that 
4 matter and ask more questions, or did you just hang up on him? 
5 A. It was my under -- my impression that he --
6 Q. Now --
7 A. was investigating another matter. 
8 Q. did you -- okay, so did you ask him about that 
9 matter, or did you just hang up on him? 
10 A. I hung up on Officer Clanton at that point. 
11 MR. JOHNSON: That's all I have. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: Anything else? 
13 MR. SESSIONS: Nothing else, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right, please be seated. 
15 MR. SESSIONS: I'll make my second attempt at resting. 
16 Now the defense rests. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 MR. JOHNSON: The State still has no rebuttal. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Okay, with that I think we are 
20 ready to give the jury the instructions as to the law; and then 
21 following that the attorneys will make their closing arguments 
22 to you. So we have copies of the instructions so that you can 
23 follow along. 
24 I will do my best to read them verbatim. Some days it 
25 goes better than others, but that's my goal. So if I back up 
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As we've discussed, identity is the crucial issue. 
What evidence have you heard today about that? You have 
Trooper Clanton, who within 20 pounds was able to guess the 
defendant's weight, was able to ascertain the male Caucasian 
with brown hair, pulled up a photo from his DMV license, was 
able to see that it was consistent, but he didn't stop there. 
He continued to investigate, continued to narrow it down. 
You heard Mr. Sessions say, you know, "How many people 
fit that profile?" That's why we have our officers do this 
kind of investigation. Thankfully he did; he was able to track 
down the defendant's phone number. You heard the conversation 
that they had. 
That it didn't go very far; but Trooper Clanton was 
doing everything he could in his power to investigate this 
crime, to make sure that the defendant was the one. If there 
was some sort of explanation he could offer Trooper Clanton to 
get him away from realizing he was the real driver, that was 
the opportunity to tell Trooper Clanton, and he didn't. 
I think that when you look at the totality of the 
circumstances, you will see that the defendant owned the car. 
He looked like the driver, was consistent with the picture of 
the driver; and when he had an opportunity within that within 
an hour of this incident, he failed to take that opportunity 
to talk to the officer about the incident, to explain it away 
somehow. I 
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that the defendant's car is stopped, an individual matching 
the defendant's car is behind the wheel, the sole occupant, and 
that Officer -- Trooper Clanton calls the defendant. There's 
no doubt who's the defendant. At that point, to get a call 
from an officer, what is reasonable? 
You heard him say, "Well, I thought he was calling 
about something else." Did you then ask him, "Well, what are 
you calling about? Let's talk some more about this. Can we 
clear this up?" I was never -- I was not out there. I don't 
know what you're talking about. I haven't met you before. 
None of those things happened. 
What happened was he hung up the phone. Is that 
reasonable to believe that he was just confused. That he was 
just exercising his right to remain silent. Is that what he 
said to you today? Did he say, "I decided to exercise my right 
to remain silent, and I hung up." That's not what he said. 
MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I — the defendant's not 
required to say that; and I think making comments upon his 
exercising of that right in closing is inappropriate. So I 
would obj ect. 
-THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection, although I 
think enough's been said. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Hanging up that phone, ladies and 
gentlemen, showed his consciousness of guilt. On October 22nd 
of 2008 he got away from Trooper Clanton. Do not let him get 
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I think if you're at your -- your office is still 
up at Jamestown? 
MR. 
THE 
that's fine. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
not supposed 
MR. 
THE 
SESSIONS: Yeah. 
COURT: If you're at your office at Jamestown, 
That will be close enough. 
SESSIONS: I'll probably be upstairs, actually. 
COURT: Oh, let's see, Judge Howard's calendar? 
SESSIONS: Yeah. 
COURT: Okay. All right, well, let's see. You're 
to have your cell phone turned on. Okay, so --
SESSIONS: It's on vibrate. 
COURT: All right, so if you'll have it on vibrate; 
and if you leave the building, you'll let them know that you've 
gone, that will be helpful. Okay, thank you. We'll be in 
recess. 
COURT BAILIFF: All rise. 
(Re< 
THE 
about 3:30 --
:ess taken) 
COURT: Okay, we are now on the record. It is 
- 3:30 by that clock, 3:32 by my watch; and the 
jury has -- and I've got Mr. Johnson here in the courtroom, 
and Mr. Sessions here by phone. Here's the question. "Would 
it have been allowed for the prosecuting attorney to ask the 
defendant where he was on the night of October 22?" 
MR. 
MR. 
SESSIONS: No. That was (inaudible) alibi. 
JOHNSON: Why didn't -- yeah, the dang prosecutor 
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1 overlooked that one. 
2 THE COURT: I'm inclined to do something like this. 
3 "Due to an evidentiary ruling made by the Court, the prosecutor 
4 was not allowed to ask that question." Now, the question is 
5 whether that seems to be laying blame. 
6 MR. SESSIONS: (Inaudible). 
7 THE COURT: Say that again. 
8 MR. SESSIONS: Or you can put that neither party was 
9 allowed to ask that question. 
10 MR. JOHNSON: Either party was not allowed to ask --
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MS. SESSIONS: That the parties were not allowed to. 
13 MR. JOHNSON: I'm fine with that, Brook. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Should I preface it with, "Due to an 
15 evidentiary ruling made by the Court," so that they understand 
16 that this was a legal issue? 
17 MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
18 MR. SESSIONS: Yeah, I think you should. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: I'd like that (inaudible). 
20 THE COURT: Okay, let me have a pen here. Okay, 
21 and let me do some writing. Hang on a second. Here's the 
22 answer. "Due to an earlier evidentiary ruling made by the 
23 Court, neither party was allowed to ask that question." Do 
24 either of you want me to ask something like, "You are not to 
25 concern yourselves with the reasons for the ruling"? 
